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RECENT DECISIONS
to interfere with religious practices. 6 Freedom of speech is, likewise,
not absolute but subject to the regulations for the common good. The
state may regulate it in the course of exercising its police power,1 but
public power ends where an infringement of the fundamental rights
begins.8 A statute which allows an arbitrary denial and censorship
of religion and speech is unconstitutional. 9 Regulation must be in
the public interest, and non-discriminatory. In the instant case the
right to solicit is made to depend upon the approval or disapproval
of a particular religion by an administrative official. Such censorship
violates the constitutional guaranties,10 although a court may over-
rule the official's judgment. The state has the power to punish sub-
sequent abuses and such power is consistent with the constitutional
privileges." Whether one has been denied the liberties guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment must appear from the facts of the
case.12 The state cannot abridge the constitutional liberty of one'
rightfully upon the street to impart information by speaking or dis-
tributing pamphlets, but it can lawfully regulate the conduct of those
using the streets.' 3 Treating the conviction of inciting a breach of
the peace as analogous to a conviction under a statute containing the
elements of that common law offense we see that the liberty of Cant-
well has been unlawfully abridged. He preached his notion of re-
ligion and tried to persuade others to believe with him as he had a
right to do under the Constitution.
L.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWV-RELIGIOUS FREEDOM-FLAG SALUTE
IN PUBLIC ScHooLs.-The Gobitis children, members of the sect
known as "Jehovah's Witnesses", were expelled' from the Miners-
8 Ibid.
7 Gitlow v. People, 268 U. S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925) ; Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18,
46 AtI. 409 (1900) ; People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175 (1902) ; N. Y.
PEN. LAw §§ 160, 161 (anarchy),8 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931); Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
9 Lowell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 Sup. Ct. 666 (1938) ; Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939) ; Schneider v. State 308 U. S. 147,
60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939) ("Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the
name of charity and religion, we hold a municipality cannot, for this reason,
require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authori-
ties for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say
some ideas may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some
persons may, while others may not, disseminate information from house to
house. Frauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law. Trespasses
may similarly be forbidden").
30 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
"1Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct 625 (1931).
12 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. 247 (1919).13 Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
'Action of Superintendent claimed to be pursuant to regulation of Miners-
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ville public schools because of their refusal to participate in the daily
school exercise of saluting the national flag on the grounds that such
a salute is forbidden by command of Scripture.2  Their father then
brought suit to enjoin the action of the school board. On certiorari
to Supreme Court of the United States from judgment 3 of Circuit
Court of Appeals affirming decree 4 of District Court granting in-
junction and affirming order 6, denying dismissal of complaint, held,
reversed. The requirement of the Minersville school board that pupils
salute the national flag in a daily school exercise as a condition of
attendance does not infringe, without due process, the liberty guar-
anteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mnersville School District
v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 60 Sup. Ct. 1010 (1940).
The prevailing 6 opinion in the present 7 case seems to rest upon
the ground that the task of determining what means are appropriate
for promoting national unity through education should be left to the
legislature or school boards, and not assumed by the courts. This is
not denied. But it is respectfully maintained that when a measure,
whose appropriateness has been affirmed by the legislature, is chal-
lenged on the constitutional ground of freedom of conscience, it is
the function of the court to adjudicate the matter on the merits of
the particular case. To proceed otherwise is practically to nullify
whatever constitutional guaranties may be involved, since the legis-
lative body is an interested party and hardly competent to judge the
constitutionality of its own measures. Besides, experience shows that
questions of practical importance-the need for immediate action, the
apparent efficacy and appropriateness of a particular measure-may
sometimes distract the attention of legislators from the constitutional
question involved, or interfere, all unconsciously, with the accuracy of
their judgment in that regard. Judicial review, therefore, would seem
to be imperative.
A consideration of this case on its merits leads to the conclusion
that national unity does not demand the infringement of religious lib-
erty by the compulsory flag salute. In the first place, since patriotism
ville Board of Education (Nov. 6, 1935) as authorized by legislature, prescrib-
ing instruction in "Civics and loyalty to the State and National Government."
PURDON'S PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES, tit. 24, § 1551.
2 Reliance is placed on the following verses from chapter 20 of Exodwu:
"3 Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
4 Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any like-
ness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth:
5 Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them:
3 108 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
424 F. Supp. 271 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
521 F. Supp. 581 (E. D. Pa. 1937).6 Mr. Justice Stone dissenting.
7 For other cases involving flag salute see Leoles v. Landers, 302 U. S. 656,
58 Sup. Ct. 364 (1937); Hering v. State Board of Education, 303 U. S. 624,
58 Sup. Ct. 752 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U. S. 621, 59 Sup. Ct.
786 (1939); Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U. S. 621, 59 Sup. Ct. 791 (1939);
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and loyalty cannot be brought about by legislative compulsion, the
chief value of the voluntary flag salute is lost when its performance
becomes mandatory. The flag may be honored by the use of the
police power in protecting it from desecration," but it is "dishonored
by a salute by a child in reluctant and terrified obedience to a com-
mand of secular authority which clashes with the dictates of con-
science." 9
It is conceded that there may be times when the government may
lawfully demand a public and external manifestation of the loyalty
of its citizens. But it has no right, in the face of religious protests,
to demand that that manifestation assume a particular, arbitrary form,
when some other and religiously unobjectionable form would serve
its purpose equally well. If national unity may be attained and free-
dom of conscience left uninfringed by the use of means other than
the flag salute, those means should be used. 10 Our national history
bears eloquent testimony that there are such means. Patriotism and
loyalty were not born in this country with the enactment of the first
flag salute statute 1 and the educational system which cannot foster
them without infringing liberty of conscience is on the verge of
pedagogical bankruptcy.
To be sure, national unity, freedom and security are fostered by
external marks of respect for the flag which symbolizes them. But
they are, nevertheless, independent of these acts. To forget this fact
is to risk falling into a dangerous formalism; it is to confuse the sym-
bol with the thing symbolized; the shadow with the reality; flag
waving with patriotism. The patriotism of the Gobitis children is
not on trial. The lower courts found that there was no question of
their substantial loyalty.12 And when we have the substance of loy-
alty we can well afford to overlook the children's refusal to external-
ize it by some accidental and arbitrary form to which they objected
on religious grounds. The greater danger lies in false professions of
loyalty; the undetected enemy saluting the flag he plans to destroy.
There seems to be no valid reason, then, for the denial to the Gobitis
children of their freedom of conscience and the 'compulsory flag salute
would appear to be an unjustified and unconstitutional use of the
police power.
J. T. T., c.m.
Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of Lynn, 297 Mass. 65, 7 N. E. (2d)
577 (1937) ; People v. Sandstrom, 279 N. Y. 523, 18 N. E. (2d) 840 (1939).
8 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct. 419 (1907).
9 People v. Sandstrom, 279 N. Y. 523, 539, 18 N. E. (2d) 840, 847 (1939).
10 A parallel may be seen in the requirement in New York State that wit-
nesses be examined under oath. The mode of swearing witnesses is prescribed
by C. P. A. § 360. But religious objections thereto are respected by the provision
of alternative forms. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 361, 363, 364. Where religious
scruples forbid the taking an oath of any kind, an affirmation may be substituted.
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 362.
11 See 108 F. (2d) 683, 684 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (first flag salute statute,
Kansas, 1907).
1 24 F. Supp. 271, 273 (E. D. Pa. 1939).
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